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Abstract
The extent to which federal investment in research crowds out or decreases incentives for
investment from other funding sources remains an open question. Scholarship on research
funding has focused on the relationship between federal and industry or, more comprehen-
sively, non-federal funding without disentangling the other sources of research support that
include nonprofit organizations and state and local governments. This paper extends our
understanding of academic research support by considering the relationships between fed-
eral and non-federal funding sources provided by the National Science Foundation Higher
Education Research and Development Survey. We examine whether federal research
investment serves as a complement or substitute for state and local government, nonprofit,
and industry research investment using the population of research-active academic science
fields at U.S. doctoral granting institutions. We use a system of two equations that instru-
ments with prior levels of both federal and non-federal funding sources and accounts for
time-invariant academic institution-field effects through first differencing. We estimate that a
1% increase in federal research funding is associated with a 0.411% increase in nonprofit
research funding, a 0.217% increase in state and local research funding, and a 0.468%
increase in industry research funding, respectively. Results indicate that federal funding
plays a fundamental role in inducing complementary investments from other funding
sources, with impacts varying across academic division, research capacity, and institutional
control.
Introduction
In 2014, $52.2 billion was invested in academic science research at U.S. doctoral granting insti-
tutions. This funding was provided by multiple sources to further specific objectives. While
industry aims to create new products and innovations that will spur commercial benefit, state
and local governments invest to realize tangible economic benefits within their borders, and
nonprofit organizations invest to create public benefits that will improve societal welfare. The
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federal government, however, accounts for the largest share of investment with the broader
objectives of promoting mission agency mandates and conducting research important for
national economic priorities.
The presence of multiple stakeholders prompts a debate over the extent to which different
funding sources are complements or substitutes. Members of the U.S. Congress debate the
extent to which federal investment in research crowds out or decreases incentives for invest-
ment from other funding sources. Under this scenario, federal funding yields no net increase in
R&D investment and therefore is not a good use of taxpayer funds. The alternative view is that
federal investment supports high-risk research that typically has long time horizons and
induces additional investment by other funding sources. According to this view, federal invest-
ment crowds in complementary funding from non-federal sources.
Studies examining this phenomenon highlight the methodological concerns over sample
selection bias and causal identification [1]. Selection bias, in particular, accounts for the lack of
consensus on the effect of government spending on firm level R&D investment activity [1–2]
due to limited access to detailed R&D financing data for proprietary firms. Another limitation
has been the prominent focus on the relationship between federal and industry or federal and
total non-federal sources of R&D funding [3–4]. Prior to 2010, the National Science Founda-
tion’s (NSF) Survey of Research and Development Expenditures at Universities and Colleges
provided expenditure data by five categories: federal, state and local government, industry, uni-
versity-own institution, and the catch all other category. However, in 2010 the survey was rede-
signed as the NSF Higher Education Research and Development (HERD) Survey. Currently,
five annual panels of institution-field level R&D data are available (2010–2014), which provide
an unprecedented ability to examine the fuller range of research funders at the more granular
level of the academic field within the institution. Moreover, nonprofit funders are now a dis-
tinct category.
Taken together, this paper aims to address these past limitations and contribute to the
scholarship with the following:
1. Relying on the recent and detailed NSF HERD survey data, we are able both to understand
the more detailed role of a fuller range of non-federal funders and to examine their
relationships.
2. We are able to avoid sample selection bias by examining the population of academic science
fields with active federal funding at U.S. doctoral-granting institutions.
3. By analyzing academic fields–arguably analogous to academic departments–we provide a
more detailed understanding of funding relationships at the unit of research production.
4. Employing an instrumental variables estimation procedure, we can more appropriately iso-
late the relationship between funding sources. We use a dynamic panel model to address
identification by instrumenting with prior levels of both federal and non-federal funding
sources.
This approach produces empirical evidence to advance our understanding of the relation-
ship between research funders investing in science fields at academic institutions. We find that
federal funding plays a fundamental role in inducing complementary investments from other
funding sources. Our analysis reveals that impacts vary across broad divisions of academic sci-
ence fields, public versus private institutional control, and academic field research capacity.
The evidence suggests that federal dollars are crowding in investments from other non-federal
funders to achieve broad societal objectives.
The Domino Effects of Federal Research Funding
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Data and Research Design
The NSF HERD Survey asks university respondents to apportion annual research expenditures
to academic fields by research funding source. The fields loosely mirror academic departments.
The funding sources include the federal government, state and local governments, nonprofit
organizations, university-own funds, industry, and other sources. The latter category of other
includes foreign support and individual sponsorship. While universities self-report the funding
allocations, we draw upon this dataset given that it serves as the primary source for the portfo-
lio of research expenditures within U.S. higher education institutions (http://www.nsf.gov/
statistics/srvyherd/#qs&sd).
We analyze 26 standard science fields, which we assign to six broad academic divisions–Life
Sciences, Engineering, Mathematical and Computer Sciences, Physical Sciences, Environmen-
tal Sciences, and Social Sciences and Psychology. Table 1 shows the crosswalk between the aca-
demic divisions and fields. For the analysis, we draw the sample from U.S. doctoral-granting
academic institutions as defined by the National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics
(NCSES) based on the classification of “doctoral-granting” institutions from the variable “high-
est degree granted.” We exclude specialized institutions with only a medical or engineering
focus as identified by the NSF’s Web Computer-Aided Science Policy Analysis and Research
(WebCASPAR) database.
There is great diversity among science fields both in terms of the amount of money received
and the share from alternative funding sources. Fig 1 presents stacked bar charts for the distri-
bution of research expenditures by the sources tracked by the NSF HERD Survey for the six
broad academic divisions. The distribution is based on the average funding from 2010 to 2014.
Overall, federal funding accounts for 63% of academic R&D, while industry, state and local,
and nonprofits each contribute between 5% and 6%. This distribution, however, varies across
the six broad science divisions. For example, federal funding provides almost three-quarters of
funding in the physical sciences (73%) and mathematics and computer sciences (74%). How-
ever, the proportion of federal funding is 54% for the social sciences and psychology. Regarding
non-federal sources, nonprofits account for 9% of funding in the social sciences and psychol-
ogy, while industry funds 8% of research for engineering.
Table 1. Crosswalk between Academic Division and Academic Field.
Academic Division Academic Field
Engineering Aerospace Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Civil Engineering,
Electrical Engineering, Materials Engineering, Mechanical Engineering,
Other Engineering
Environmental Sciences Atmospheric Sciences, Earth Sciences, Oceanography, Other
Geosciences
Life Sciences Agricultural Sciences, Biological Sciences, Medical Sciences, Other Life
Sciences
Mathematical and Computer
Sciences
Mathematics and Statistics, Computer Science
Physical Sciences Astronomy, Chemistry, Other Physical Sciences, Physics
Social Sciences and
Psychology
Psychology, Economics, Political Science and Public Administration,
Sociology, Other Social Sciences
Notes: The crosswalk follows NSF’s S&E Field Classification. For this analysis we group together
Mathematics with Computer Sciences and Psychology with Social Sciences. Source: http://www.nsf.gov/
statistics/rdexpenditures/glossary/s_efield.htm
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157325.t001
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University-own (internal) funds account for 19% of research overall, with a range of 16%
for mathematical and computer sciences to 27% for social sciences and psychology. University-
own funding is difficult to categorize because it is a combination of interest income from
endowment, gifts, bequests, and other contributions to the university that are not counted as
sponsored research but are subsequently allocated to research funding. These funds are often
used as start-up packages to faculty or internal competitions. Use of university-own funds is
higher for public universities (22%) than in private universities (12%). Interviews with univer-
sity sponsored research offices and development offices revealed variation in what is reported
in this category, suggesting that this category is itself somewhat of a catchall that warrants addi-
tional investigation that is beyond this paper. For this analysis, we exclude this source of fund-
ing and estimate the relationship between five funding sources: federal government, state and
local government, nonprofit organizations, industry, and other.
With an explicit focus of examining the effect of federal funding on a range of other non-
federal sources, we only include observations for academic fields with an active federal funding
stream over the entire five-year panel (2010–2014) of the NSF HERD survey. Observations are
at the institution-field level, and offer a more granular unit of analysis at the level of research
production–arguably analogous to academic departments. Given this focus, the sample is
drawn from the more research-active doctoral granting U.S. institutions. This sample of active,
federally-funded institution-fields accounts for 35 percent of the population of fields and
roughly 91 percent of federal research funding reported in the five-year panel of the NSF
HERD survey. Additional research might examine factors that account for funding variation
among the entire population of science fields; however, we narrow the sample given the focus
of our primary research question.
While each academic field in our sample reports a continuous stream of active federal fund-
ing, a portion of these fields lacks consistent funding from the non-federal sources. The
Fig 1. Distribution of R&D Funding Source by Broad Field, 2010–2014.Notes: Percentages reflect the distribution of funding sources based on average
division funding levels (adjusted for inflation) from 2010 to 2014. Dollar values listed in parentheses are the nominal total university funding in 2014 ($1,000s)
by division.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157325.g001
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percentage of zero observations in the panel is 40% for state and local government, 30% for
nonprofit organizations, and 33% for industry funding. Given that parameters for sample
selection are determined by federal funding activity, we include these observations in the analy-
sis. Moreover, we adjust all funding levels to account for inflation using the Gross Domestic
Product Implicit Price Deflator, with 2009 as the base year. We then use the natural log form in
all estimations. The NSF HERD Survey reports funding data in $1,000s, which we adjust before
taking the natural log. For observations with zero non-federal funding values, we set the level
to one before computing the natural log to ensure the natural log is equivalent to zero.
The sample consists of 3,460 unique institution-field observations (indexed by institution n
and field i) from 266 institutions. The median number of science fields represented per institu-
tion is 13 (out of a possible 26, refer to Table 1 for full list) with a standard deviation of 6.5. With
a five-year, balanced panel, this yields a total of 17,300 institution-field-year observations. The
supplementary information–S1 File–annotates the entire data building process and empirical
techniques presented in the paper. The code for both components–data building and empirical
analysis–are publicly available online. In addition, we have uploaded the cleaned dataset. This
information is available at: doi:10.7264/N3W957G6<http://hdl.handle.net/1794/19409>.
Estimation Method
We are interested in estimating the effect of federal R&D funding on a series of non-federal
sources. Formally, we express this relationship with the function:
Yint ¼ f ðXint;Yint1;Zint;At; ainÞ
where i denotes the academic field, n indexes the institution, and t is the annual time period. Y
is the outcome variable of the non-federal funding source of interest. We estimate models for
three outcomes: state and local, nonprofit, and industry R&D funding. X delimits the key
explanatory variable–federal R&D funding. Z denotes the set of non-federal funding that
excludes Y–the outcome variable being estimated. This controls for fluctuations in the broader
R&D funding portfolio that may cause spurious correlation with the primary relationship of
interest. A captures annual general macroeconomic shocks that might affect R&D funding
streams. α is an institution-field fixed effect to account for time-invariant factors, which is
essential as academic settings constitute highly institutionalized, organizational fields that are
resistant to change [5–6]. Lastly, we include the one-year lagged dependent variable, Yt−1, to
control for prior capacity to secure the non-federal funding outcome.
We are interested in the relationships between these different funding sources, which are
however, endogenous and jointly determined. Inclusion of the one-year lagged dependent vari-
able and fixed effects estimators alone, though, does not obviate endogeneity as the lagged
component, Yint−1, is correlated with the error component, εint−1, in the fixed effects model [7].
In their seminal paper, Arellano and Bond [8] offer a resolution by instrumenting the lagged
dependent variable at least two periods in the fixed effects model. This work has served as the
foundation for a larger body of scholarship on dynamic panel models [9–12]. As an extension,
Blundell and Bond [13] advanced this method by developing an additional approach to
increase the efficiency of the model by instrumenting levels with first differences rather than
relying on standard fixed effects [11].
We draw upon these methods to include both first differences and the instrumented lagged
dependent variable. In addition, dynamic panel models also utilize a set of instruments to
account for endogeneity of prior trends of independent variables. Given that federal R&D
funding has historically high and relatively stable levels of research investment [14], we treat
this regressor as predetermined, which assumes that it is correlated with past errors, but
The Domino Effects of Federal Research Funding
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uncorrelated with future errors. Federal funding is then instrumented with the following lags:
Xint−1, . . ., Xint−4. [11, 13].
We also instrument for the additional contemporaneous non-federal funding activity,
which we expect to be influenced by federal funding levels and potentially to influence each
other. If excluded, this could confound the primary relationship of interest. For example,
changes in industry-funded research may influence federal funding investment for the field of
engineering, causing a spurious correlation between nonprofit and federal funding if industry
is omitted. Table 2 presents the set of controls, Z, for each model.
Given that we assume each of our outcomes of non-federal funding are endogenous, we also
estimate the vector of additional non-federal regressors with multiple lags starting with the two
year lag, Zint−2, . . ., Zint−4, for each source indicated in Table 2 [15].
Taken together, this instrumental variables approach conditions on the following: (i) first
differences to control for institution-field specific variation; (ii) the lagged dependent regressor
to address endogeneity of the non-federal funding outcome; and (iii) other, contemporaneous
non-federal funding activity that cause spurious correlation. While other studies have relied on
this model [16–17], to our knowledge this method has not been applied in this line of scholar-
ship on R&D funding relationships spanning the public and private spheres. The supplemen-
tary notation–S2 File–presents a more detailed explanation and additional motivation of the
primary estimation method.
Eq 1 presents the primary dynamic panel model, where i denotes the field, n denotes the
institution, and t denotes the year. Eqs 1.1–1.3 expand the estimations for each set of instru-
ments. w denotes the instrument for Eqs 1.1–1.3. All funding sources are estimated in log form.
DYint ¼ b1ðDXintÞ þ b2ðDYint1Þ þ bzðDZintÞ þ At þ Dεint ð1Þ
where,
DXint ¼ d1 þ
X4
‘¼1
ðdw1;‘ðXint‘ÞÞ þ ε2int ð1:1Þ
DYint1 ¼ d2 þ
X4
k¼2
ðdw2;kðYintkÞÞ þ ε3int ð1:2Þ
DZint ¼ d3 þ
X4
k¼2
ðdw3;kðZintkÞÞ þ ε4int ð1:3Þ
and where ‘ ranges from 1 to 4 (‘  1) and k ranges from 2 to 4 (k 2), thus each regressor is
instrumented with multiple lags. The Model Specification I in the supplementary materials–S3
File–presents the complete notation for these three sets of equations, respectively. Given that
we estimate contemporaneous R&D funding activity, we do not claim to estimate causality
with this model. However, this approach offers advantages by controlling for factors that con-
found the results.
Table 2. R&DOutcome Source and Respective Controls.
R&D Outcome Source (Y) Controls of Non-Federal Funding Sources (Z)
Nonprofit State & Local, Industry, Other
State & Local Nonprofit, Industry, Other
Industry Nonprofit, State & Local, Other
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157325.t002
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Results and Discussion
Table 3 presents results for the instrumental variables model (Eq 1) for the full sample for each
outcome. Column 1 presents the results for the relationships with state and local government
funding, while Column 2 presents the results for the relationships with nonprofit organizations
and Column 3 for industry. The standard errors are clustered by institution-field to account
for autocorrelation; this is the most granular unit available within this dataset. All funding
sources are estimated in log form. In estimating the marginal effect for these log-log models,
the coefficients are reported as the elasticity or responsiveness of non-federal sources to a
change in federal or other funding levels. Note that elasticity is interpreted as a 1% change in
the X variable being associated with a Beta% change in the Y variable. For these estimations, a
1% increase in federal funding is associated with a Beta% change in the funding level of state
and local, nonprofit, or industry.
The coefficient for federal funding activity–the primary explanatory variable–is positive and
statistically significant across each outcome, providing consistent evidence of a complementary
Table 3. Dynamic Panel Model Results by Outcome (Eq 1).
Variables (1) (2) (3)
State & Local Nonprofit Industry
Logged Funding Source
Federal 0.217*** 0.411*** 0.468***
(0.077) (0.073) (0.076)
State & Local 0.045*** 0.006
(0.014) (0.030)
Nonprofit 0.036** 0.031**
(0.015) (0.015)
Industry 0.075** 0.139***
(0.036) (0.036)
Other 0.001 0.033** 0.069***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
One Year Lagged Logged Dependent Variable 0.527*** 0.460*** 0.428***
(0.020) (0.018) (0.019)
Observations 13,840 13,840 13,840
Number of Institution-fields 3,460 3,460 3,460
Year Dummies Included Yes Yes Yes
First Differences Yes Yes Yes
Post-specification Test Results
Serial Correlation AR(2) Pr > z Fail to Pass Pass Pass
Sargan/Over-Identification (Prob > chi2) Fail to Pass Fail to Pass Fail to Pass
Notes: Column 1 presents results with state and local R&D as the outcome (referring to Equations A and A.1 – A.5 in supplementary materials–S3 File);
Column 2 presents results with nonprofit R&D as the outcome (referring to Equations B and B.1 – B.5 in supplementary materials–S3 File); Column 3
presents results with industry R&D as the outcome (referring to Equations C and C.1 – C.5 in supplementary materials–S3 File); clustered standard errors
in parentheses (clustered by institution-field)
*** p<0.01
** p<0.05
* p<0.1. All funding is adjusted to FY 2009 and estimated in log form; dependent variable is logged funding of specified type; coefficients are elasticities.
Federal funding is treated as predetermined and uses time t – ‘, where ‘  1, to instrument for t; the set of other funding sources are treated as
endogenous and use time t–k, where k  2, to instrument for t; the lagged dependent variable is treated as endogenous and uses time t–k, where k  2,
to instrument for t– 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157325.t003
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relationship. The largest complementary relationship is for industry such that a 1% increase in
federal R&D funding is associated with a 0.468% increase in the amount of industry R&D fund-
ing, on average. A 1% increase in federal R&D funding is also associated with a 0.411% increase
in funding by nonprofits and a 0.217% increase in funding by state and local governments.
Table 3 also provides evidence of complementarity between the sources of non-federal R&D
funding and the respective outcome. Across all three outcomes, the set of additional non-fed-
eral funding sources exhibits a positive and statistically significant relationship with the excep-
tion of other funding on state and local (Col. 1) and of state and local on industry funding (Col.
3). However, the size of the effect for the primary explanatory variable is an order of magnitude
larger than the additional contemporaneous sources of non-federal research.
There are two post specification tests available to determine if the error terms across years
are serially uncorrelated and if the lagged instruments meet the test of over-identifying restric-
tions, respectively [11]. For the former, we estimate whether Δεint are correlated with Δεint−k
for k = 2. While this test measures for k 2, we are restricted, since we only have a five year
panel. This is calculated based on the correlation of fitted residuals Dcεint . For the latter, we rely
on the Sargan statistic to estimate if the population moment conditions are correct [15] (pg.
301). As noted in Table 3, the estimation satisfies the first test of serial correlation for the out-
comes of nonprofit and industry funding, but not for state and local funding. The results fail to
pass the Sargan test of over-identification for each outcome. This statistic, however, is prone to
weakness with dynamic panel models given that it grows weaker as the number of instruments
increases [11, 18]. For each set of estimations presented above the number of instruments is 61.
Moreover, as Sargan [19] noted in his seminal work, the validity of the test is “proportional to
the number of instrumental variables, so that, if the asymptotic approximations are to be used,
this number must be small” (pg. 393). We recognize that this is a tradeoff for using a model
reliant on multiple instruments.
Additional Model Specifications
Because of the policy importance of the results, we estimate a series of additional model specifi-
cations to assess consistency of the results estimated by the primary model (Eq 1). These
include the following: (i) academic institution-field and year fixed effects model (Eq 2), (ii)
pooled, cross-sectional OLS model with the inclusion of two lagged logged dependent variables
as regressors: Yint−1 and Yint−2 (Eq 3) where the standard errors are clustered at the institution-
field level; and (iii) an alternate dynamic panel model that defines the vector of regressors, Zint,
as predetermined rather than endogenous (Eq 4). For the set of equations listed below, i denotes
the field, n denotes the institution, and t denotes the year.
Yint ¼ ain þ b1ðXintÞ þ bwðZintÞ þ At þ εint ð2Þ
Yint ¼ b0 þ b1ðXintÞ þ b2ð Yint1Þ þ b3ð Yint2Þ þ bxðZintÞ þ At þ εint ð3Þ
Regarding Eq 2 and Eq 3, Angrist and Pischke [7] highlight that the conditions for consis-
tent estimation of the lagged instrument in the instrumental variables model (Eq 1) are more
demanding having more stringent assumptions than the fixed effects model or lagged depen-
dent variable model alone (p. 245). Nevertheless, we present the results from Eq 2 and Eq 3
given that they estimate fundamental components of the primary model (Eq 1) and offer useful
benchmarks.
As a third additional model specification, we relax the assumptions for the instruments in
the dynamic panel model. While our primary model (Eq 1) estimates the elasticities by treating
the set of regressors Zint as endogenous (Eq 1.3), we relax that assumption and instead treat
The Domino Effects of Federal Research Funding
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these measures as predetermined where the vector of regressors is each instrumented by Zit‘
rather than Zit−k (where ‘ ranges from 1 to 4 (‘  1) and k ranges from 2 to 4 (k 2)). With
this approach, the number of instruments increases (from 61 to 65). Eq 4 presents the general-
ized notation and includes the estimations for the endogenous (Eq 4.2) and predetermined (Eq
4.1 and Eq 4.3) instrumental variables. w denotes the instrument for Eq 4.1–4.3.
DYint ¼ b1ðDXintÞ þ b2ðDYint1Þ þ bzðDZintÞ þ At þ Dεint ð4Þ
where,
DXint ¼ d1 þ
X4
‘¼1
ð dw1;‘ðXint‘ÞÞ þ ε2int ð4:1Þ
DYint1 ¼ d2 þ
X4
k¼2
ð dw2;kðYintkÞÞ þ ε3int ð4:2Þ
DZint ¼ d3 þ
X4
‘¼1
ð dw3;‘ðZint‘ÞÞ þ ε4int ð4:3Þ
As with the primary model, the supplementary materials–S3 File–presents each complete
set of equations in the Model Specification sections II, III, and IV for Eqs 2, 3 and 4, respec-
tively. Again, to be clear, we run separate sets of models for the three non-federal investment
sources–using state and local government funding, nonprofit funding, and industry funding
each as outcomes. Refer to Table 2 for the set of controls.
Tables 4, 5 and 6 present the results for each outcome–state and local, nonprofit, and indus-
try R&D, respectively. We re-report the primary results from Eq 1 as a benchmark in Column
1 of each table. The relaxed model with the instruments for the set of non-federal funding
sources, Zint, set as predetermined (Eq 4) is presented in Column 2; the pooled OLS with dou-
ble lags of the logged dependent variable (Eq 3) is presented in Column 3; and the institution-
field and year fixed effects model (Eq 2) is presented in Column 4 for each table. As with the
primary set of models, all funding sources are estimated in log form.
The results for the primary explanatory variable–federal R&D–are robust across all of the
additional model specifications for the three outcomes. The size of the effect of federal R&D is
fairly consistent but is slightly larger in the dynamic panel models for the outcomes of non-
profit and industry funding. With a few exceptions, the results for the additional non-federal
funding relationships are also efficient and consistent.
As another effort to examine the robustness of the results, we compare the empirical results
from our primary model (Eq 1) against prior studies. Considerable scholastic attention has been
placed on this relationship; however, these studies used alternative econometric methods and
units of analysis [1, 3–4, 20–22]. Notably, we find results are sensitive to the time period and sam-
ple restrictions under consideration, yet overall there is also evidence of a complementary effect.
Diamond [22] found that a $1 increase in federal spending on basic research led, on average, to a
$0.62 increase in industry funding. Blume-Kohout, Kumar, and Sood [3] more recently relied on
a more comprehensive R&D source for the outcome and found that a $1 increase in federal fund-
ing on average leads to a $0.26 increase in non-federal academic life sciences funding.
Stratification Results
Academic division stratification. We expand our analysis by running our primary model
on a series of sample stratifications to more appropriately understand how the effect of federal
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funding on a series of non-federal sources varies in different contexts [3]. We first stratify the
sample by academic division to account for disciplinary differences [23–24] and to exploit the
funding variation presented in Fig 1. Analysis by this more granular level–in contrast to the
institution–is useful given that “disciplines have their own qualities, cultures, codes of conduct,
values, and distinctive intellectual tasks” [25] (pg. 386). The results from this analysis show
which academic fields are driving the overall effect of federal funding.
Fig 2 reports the confidence intervals for the robust results for academic divisions by out-
come; the academic division stratifications are delimited by the dashed horizontal lines and
the non-federal funding outcome is listed in line with the confidence interval on the y-axis.
The results are robust only if they are statistically significant in the primary model (Eq 1) and
efficient and consistent to the alternate dynamic panel model (Eq 4); and fixed effects model
(Eq 2).
Fig 2 shows that while the elasticity of federal R&D funding is positive and significant for
each outcome, significance is lost when stratified by division for certain fields. Specifically, we
do not find an effect of federal funding for any outcome in the fields of mathematical and com-
puter science or environmental science. However, we do find that for state and local funding
Table 4. State & Local R&D Log Expenditure Regression Results, Additional Model Specifications.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary Model Alternate Model Double Lag OLS Fixed Effects
Logged Funding Source
Federal 0.217*** 0.226*** 0.133*** 0.293***
(0.077) (0.074) (0.025) (0.0483)
Industry 0.075** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.0475***
(0.036) (0.015) (0.008) (0.00883)
Nonprofit 0.036** 0.036** 0.019** 0.0520***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.007) (0.00850)
Other 0.001 0.002 -0.006 0.00883
(0.013) (0.012) (0.007) (0.00770)
One Year Lagged Logged State & Local Funding 0.527*** 0.527*** 0.630***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.013)
Two Year Lagged Logged State & Local Funding 0.167***
(0.013)
Observations 13,840 13,840 10,380 17,300
Number of Institution-fields 3,460 3,460 3,460
Year Dummies Included Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution-field Time Invariant Controls Yes Yes No Yes
Post-specification Test Results
Serial Correlation AR(2) Pr > z Fail to Pass Fail to Pass
Sargan/Over-Identification (Prob > chi2) Fail to Pass Fail to Pass
Notes: Column 1 re-reports results from Eq 1 estimations (Table 3, Column 1); Clustered standard errors in parentheses (clustered by field);
*** p<0.01,
** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. All funding adjusted to FY 2009 and estimated in log form; dependent variable is logged state and local funding level; coefficients are elasticities.
Columns 1 & 2, federal funding (predetermined) uses time t – ‘, where ‘  1, to instrument for t; Columns 1 & 2, lagged dependent variable (endogenous)
uses time t–k, where k  2, to instrument for t– 1; Column 1, other set of funding sources (endogenous) use time t–k, where k  2, to instrument for t;
Column 2, other set of funding sources (predetermined) use time t – ‘, where ‘  1, to instrument for t. Institution-field time invariant controls refers to first
difference for Columns 1 and 2 and institution-field fixed effects for Column 4 (αin from Eq 2).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157325.t004
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the overall effect is being driven by the fields of engineering and social sciences and psychology
with elasticities of 0.420 and 0.285, respectively. Alternately, for nonprofit funding, federal
funding crowds in for the fields of social sciences and psychology and the life sciences such that
a 1% increase in federal R&D funding is associated with an increase in nonprofit R&D funding
by 0.627% in social sciences and psychology fields and by 0.646% in the life sciences. For indus-
try, federal funding crowds in additional industry funding in the physical sciences (0.445), life
sciences (0.537), and engineering (0.579).
Research capacity stratification. Funding from non-federal sources may be affected by
the capacity to conduct research within a specific academic field. Certain scientific fields are nota-
ble regardless of characteristics of their institution. We include an additional stratification based
on research capacity in each of the 26 academic scientific fields. We define high research capacity
as the top quartile based on the distribution of total research expenditures for each respective aca-
demic field. We classify a field as being high capacity if at any point in the five-year time frame
(2010–2014) they appear in the top quartile. All others are classified as low capacity.
Fig 3 provides confidence intervals for the robust results for both high capacity and low
capacity divisions. Again, the results are robust only if they are efficient and consistent to the
Table 5. Nonprofit R&D Log Expenditure Regression Results, Additional Model Specifications.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary Model Alternate Model Double Lag OLS Fixed Effects
Logged Funding Source
Federal 0.411*** 0.471*** 0.319*** 0.271***
(0.073) (0.069) (0.025) (0.0482)
Industry 0.139*** 0.036** 0.026*** 0.0331***
(0.036) (0.015) (0.008) (0.00882)
State & Local 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.019*** 0.0518***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.006) (0.00848)
Other 0.033** 0.044*** 0.019*** -0.0139*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.00769)
One Year Lagged Logged Nonprofit Funding 0.460*** 0.466*** 0.578***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.012)
Two Year Lagged Logged Nonprofit Funding 0.138***
(0.012)
Observations 13,840 13,840 10,380 17,300
Number of Institution-fields 3,460 3,460 3,460
Year Dummies Included Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution-field Time Invariant Controls Yes Yes No Yes
Post-specification Test Results
Serial Correlation AR(2) Pr > z Pass Pass
Sargan/Over-Identification (Prob > chi2) Fail to Pass Fail to Pass
Notes: Column 1 re-reports results from Eq 1 estimations (Table 3, Column 2); Clustered standard errors in parentheses;
*** p<0.01,
** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. All funding adjusted to FY 2009 and estimated in log form; dependent variable is logged nonprofit funding level; coefficients are elasticities.
Columns 1 & 2, federal funding (predetermined) uses time t – ‘, where ‘  1, to instrument for t; Columns 1 & 2, lagged dependent variable (endogenous)
uses time t–k, where k  2, to instrument for t– 1; Column 1, other set of funding sources (endogenous) use time t–k, where k  2, to instrument for t;
Column 2, other set of funding sources (predetermined) use time t – ‘, where ‘  1, to instrument for t. Institution-field time invariant controls refers to first
difference for Columns 1 and 2 and institution-field fixed effects for Column 4 (αin from Eq 2).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157325.t005
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following model specifications: (i) primary model (Eq 1); (ii) alternate dynamic panel model
(Eq 4); and fixed effects model (Eq 2). The results are quite varied by outcome, division, and
research capacity. For state and local funding, there is only evidence of federal crowd-in for
high capacity engineering fields. The effect is much stronger with an elasticity of 0.757 com-
pared to the elasticity of 0.420 for the full sample of engineering fields in Fig 2.
Regarding both nonprofit and industry funding, there are many more robustly significant
findings. For the full sample, there is evidence of federal crowd-in of both industry and non-
profit funding for both high and low capacity fields, but the effect is larger for high capacity
fields. The results straddle the elasticities of Fig 2. For industry funding, the higher crowd-in
rate in high capacity fields is being driven by high capacity fields from the mathematical and
computer science division (denoted in the figure as Computer Sciences), with an elasticity of
1.212. For nonprofits, the effect is also concentrated in the mathematical and computer science
fields with an elasticity of 1.060 with an additional smaller effect in social sciences and psychol-
ogy of 0.460. The elasticities for high capacity mathematical and computer sciences are the
largest with over a 1:1 return on federal funding; this points to a greater responsiveness to mar-
ginal increases in federal funding activity.
Table 6. Industry R&D Log Expenditure Regression Results, Additional Model Specifications.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary Model Alternate Model Double Lag OLS Fixed Effects
Logged Funding Source
Federal 0.468*** 0.461*** 0.369*** 0.340***
(0.076) (0.075) (0.025) (0.0464)
State & Local 0.006 0.026* 0.054*** 0.0440***
(0.030) (0.015) (0.007) (0.00817)
Nonprofit 0.031** 0.031** 0.023*** 0.0307***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.008) (0.00819)
Other 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.026*** 0.0247***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.00741)
One Year Lagged Logged Industry Funding 0.428*** 0.427*** 0.549***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.013)
Two Year Lagged Logged Industry Funding 0.178***
(0.013)
Observations 13,840 13,840 10,380 17,300
Number of Institution-fields 3,460 3,460 3,460
Year Dummies Included Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution-field Time Invariant Controls Yes Yes No Yes
Post-specification Test Results
Serial Correlation AR(2) Pr > z Pass Pass
Sargan/Over-Identification (Prob > chi2) Fail to Pass Fail to Pass
Notes: Column 1 re-reports results from Eq 1 estimations (Table 3, Column 3); Clustered standard errors in parentheses (clustered by field);
*** p<0.01,
** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. All funding adjusted to FY 2009 and estimated in log form; dependent variable is logged industry funding level; coefficients are elasticities.
Columns 1 & 2, federal funding (predetermined) uses time t – ‘, where ‘  1, to instrument for t; Columns 1 & 2, lagged dependent variable (endogenous)
uses time t–k, where k  2, to instrument for t– 1; Column 1, other set of funding sources (endogenous) use time t–k, where k  2, to instrument for t;
Column 2, other set of funding sources (predetermined) use time t – ‘, where ‘  1, to instrument for t. Institution-field time invariant controls refers to first
difference for Columns 1 and 2 and institution-field fixed effects for Column 4 (αin from Eq 2).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157325.t006
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Regarding low capacity findings, the results from Fig 3 for nonprofits and industry are simi-
lar to those in Fig 2. For industry funding, low capacity life science and engineering divisions
exhibit federal crowd-in with elasticities of 0.394 and 0.622, respectively. This may reflect
industry preference for working locally or working for academic units with a more applied ori-
entation [26]. For nonprofit funding, social sciences and psychology and life sciences low
capacity fields also show signs of federal crowd-in with elasticities of 0.600 and 0.615, respec-
tively. This may reflect the nonprofit’s aim to build capacity and address under-researched
topics.
Institutional control stratification. One distinguishing characteristic of U.S. research
universities is the form of institutional governance. Universities may operate with a state man-
date, providing some portion of public control over their operations, or they may be entirely
private entities. Private sector governance with its greater autonomy may result in stronger
Fig 2. Robust Federal R&D Elasticity Confidence Intervals by Broad Academic Field and Non-Federal Source of Funding.Notes: Confidence
intervals of elasticities from Eq 1 estimations are presented along the x-axis (95%, 90%, and 75%). Elasticity values are presented only if the results for the
primary outcome–federal R&D funding–are efficient and consistent to the following additional model specifications: the alternate dynamic panel model (Eq 4),
and the fixed effects model (Eq 2). The y-axis reports the sample stratifications with the respective outcome listed for each confidence interval. The dashed
horizontal lines delimit the stratifications.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157325.g002
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performance. Aghion et al. [27] find evidence supportive of this claim in their study of univer-
sity governance structures on academic research output as measured by institutional rankings
and patents. However, a related study examining the effects of research spending on knowledge
production by university control type does not find substantively different effects in follow-on
funding between public and private universities [28]. While the results from their analysis
reveal preliminary patterns of differences between these two governance structures, the authors
indicate that further work is needed on this topic.
Following these previous analyses, we stratify the academic divisions by institutional con-
trol, either public or private. Seventy-three percent of the academic fields in the sample are part
of public institutions. Fig 4 presents the confidence intervals for the robust results of the aca-
demic division by institutional type for the respective non-federal funding source. We use the
Fig 3. Robust Federal R&D Elasticity Confidence Intervals by Field Research Capacity, Broad Academic Division, and Non-Federal Source of
Funding.Notes: Confidence intervals of elasticities from Eq 1 estimations are presented along the x-axis (95%, 90%, and 75%). Elasticity values are
presented only if the results for the primary outcome–federal R&D funding–are efficient and consistent to the following additional model specifications: the
alternate dynamic panel model (Eq 4), and the fixed effects model (Eq 2). The y-axis reports the sample stratifications with the respective outcome listed for
each confidence interval. The dashed horizontal lines delimit the stratifications.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157325.g003
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same procedure as the two stratifications presented above to determine the set of robust
results.
Given that a large share of the fields in the sample are part of public universities, it is not
surprising that the robust results for the public university stratifications resemble the results
presented in Fig 2. The similarities are still present when stratified by division for public uni-
versities with state and local funding showing evidence of federal crowd-in for social sciences
and psychology and engineering fields, nonprofits in social sciences and psychology and life
sciences, and industry for life sciences and engineering, all of which are also very similar in size
to the generalized findings in Fig 2.
For private universities, where we find a robust effect, the effect size is larger. There is evi-
dence of federal crowd-in of industry funding with an elasticity of 0.527. For nonprofit funding,
Fig 4. Robust Federal R&D Elasticity Confidence Intervals by Institutional Control, Broad Academic Division, and Non-Federal Source of Funding.
Notes: Confidence intervals of elasticities from Eq 1 estimations are presented along the x-axis (95%, 90%, and 75%). Elasticity values are presented only if
the results for the primary outcome–federal R&D funding–are efficient and consistent to the following additional model specifications: the alternate dynamic
panel model (Eq 4), and the fixed effects model (Eq 2). The y-axis reports the sample stratifications with the respective outcome listed for each confidence
interval. The dashed horizontal lines delimit the stratifications.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157325.g004
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a 1% increase in federal funding is associated with an increase in nonprofit funding by 0.454%
in social sciences and psychology and by 0.7% in the life sciences for private universities.
Taking this series of stratified results together, Fig 5 presents all of the robust elasticities by
model specification across the three stratifications by outcome and sample. Excluding the large
elasticities of high capacity mathematical and computer science fields, all of the elasticities fall
between 0.200 and 0.800. On average, state and local funding tends to exhibit slightly lower fed-
eral elasticities compared to nonprofit and industry funding.
Fig 5. Robust Significant Federal Elasticities by Outcome & Stratification. Notes: Elasticities from Eq 1 estimations. Elasticity values are presented only
if the results for the primary outcome–federal R&D funding–are efficient and consistent to the following additional model specifications: the alternate dynamic
panel model (Eq 4), and the fixed effects model (Eq 2). The key for Fig 5 is presented directly above. The y-axis denotes the elasticity values, while the x-axis
does not indicate any value but rather allows for the presentation of the myriad results. Additionally, Table 7 serves as a reference guide for the output in Fig
5. The left column denotes the abbreviations for the Fields and the right column references the various stratification and its corresponding referenced object
in Fig 5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157325.g005
Table 7. Field and Stratification Abbreviations for Fig 5.
Fields Stratifications
Full—Full Sample Total Sample delimited by a circle
Eng–Engineering High Research Capacity delimited by a square
LS—Life Sciences Low Research Capacity delimited by a diamond
Phy—Physical Sciences Public University delimited by a triangle
SS—Social Sciences & Psychology Private University delimited by an X
Math—Mathematical & Computer Sciences
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157325.t007
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Table 8. Comparison of Significant (Eq 1) and Robust Federal Funding Elasticities by Stratification.
Sample (1) (2) (3) Sample Size
State & Local Nonprofit Industry
Full Sample 0.217*** 0.411*** 0.468*** 13,840
(0.077) (0.073) (0.076)
By Broad Discipline
Engineering 0.420*** 0.579*** 3,684
(0.159) (0.153)
Environmental Sciences 0.511** 1,376
(0.213)
Life Sciences 0.646*** 0.537*** 2,480
(0.164) (0.158)
Mathematics & Computer Science 0.869*** 1,536
(0.227)
Physical Sciences 0.445** 2,068
(0.205)
Psychology & Social Sciences 0.285** 0.627*** 2,696
(0.127) (0.121)
By Broad Discipline & Funding Capacity
Full Sample, High Capacity 0.516*** 0.662*** 4,264
(0.174) (0.209)
Full Sample, Low Capacity 0.369*** 0.351*** 9,576
(0.083) (0.085)
Engineering, High Capacity 0.757** 1,188
(0.338)
Engineering, Low Capacity 0.622*** 2,496
(0.183)
Life Sciences, High Capacity 0.621** 688
(0.317)
Life Sciences, Low Capacity 0.615*** 0.394** 1,792
(0.183) (0.174)
Mathematics & Computer Science, High Capacity 1.060** 1.212*** 476
(0.537) (0.450)
Mathematics & Computer Science, Low Capacity 0.666** 1,060
(0.271)
Psychology & Social Sciences, High Capacity 0.460** 884
(0.202)
Psychology & Social Sciences, Low Capacity 0.600*** 1,812
(0.152)
By Broad Discipline & University Type
Full Sample, Public 0.305*** 0.451*** 0.463*** 10,068
(0.088) (0.080) (0.087)
Engineering, Public 0.512*** 0.638*** 2,684
(0.190) (0.178)
Life Sciences, Public 0.533*** 0.517*** 1,836
(0.169) (0.186)
Physical Sciences, Public 0.633*** 1,452
(0.228)
Psychology & Social Sciences, Public 0.379*** 0.547*** 1,948
(0.140) (0.139)
(Continued)
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Additional Results and Empirical Considerations
Robust to additional model specifications vs. statistically significant results for primary
model (Eq 1). For each of the Figs 2, 3, 4 and 5, elasticities are presented only if the results for
the primary outcome–federal R&D–are robust. Whereby robust means the elasticities are sta-
tistically significant and consistent across multiple model specifications of: (i) the primary
model (Eq 1); (ii) the alternate dynamic panel model (Eq 4); and (iii) the fixed effects model
(Eq 2). To present the greater range of results for the primary estimation (Eq 1), Table 8 pres-
ents both the robust and non-robust results. The non-robust are still statistically significant
federal elasticities to the Eq 1 estimation, yet not consistent and efficient across the set of addi-
tional model specifications. The table includes the federal funding elasticity and standard error
for each stratified regression by outcome. Thus each coefficient is from a unique regression.
The black cells are robust federal elasticities and the black bold cells are those federal elasticities
that are statistically significant under the primary estimation (Eq 1), but are not robust the two
additional model specifications. The results presented in black bold indicate more activity in
the fields of environmental sciences, mathematical and computer sciences, and the physical
sciences.
Sensitivity assessment of instrument specification for dynamic panel model. We rely
on a dynamic panel model as the primary model (Eq 1) to account for both the prior activity of
the dependent variable and time-invariant institution-field factors. At the same time, we are
constrained with having institution-field level funding data over a five-year time frame. To
Table 8. (Continued)
Sample (1) (2) (3) Sample Size
State & Local Nonprofit Industry
Environmental Sciences, Public 0.561** 1,072
(0.229)
Math & Computer Sciences, Public 0.845*** 1,076
(0.242)
Full Sample, Private 0.527*** 3,772
(0.151)
Math & Computer Sciences, Private 0.810*** 460
(0.245)
Life Sciences, Private 0.700*** 0.635*** 644
(0.261) (0.237)
Psychology & Social Sciences, Private 0.454** 748
(0.193)
Notes: Column 1 presents results with state and local R&D as the outcome (referring to Equations A and A.1 – A.5 in supplementary materials–S3 File);
Column 2 presents results with nonprofit R&D as the outcome (referring to Equations B and B.1 – B.5 in supplementary materials–S3 File); Column 3
presents results with industry R&D as the outcome (referring to Equations C and C.1 – C.5 in supplementary materials–S3 File); Coefficients and standard
errors are reported; coefficients represent elasticities; clustered standard errors (clustered by institution-field);
*** p<0.01,
** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Each elasticity is the federal funding coefficient by outcome across stratifications. Each elasticity is from a different regression estimating Eq 1 on
the sub-sample of the specified stratification and outcome. Black cells are those elasticities that are significant and robust to a series of model
specifications: (i) the primary model (Eq 1); (ii) the alternate dynamic panel model (Eq 4); and the fixed effects model (Eq 2). Black bold cells are
statistically significant elasticities (Eq 1), but are not robust to the full series of model specifications.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157325.t008
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Table 9. Comparison of Endogenous vs. Predetermined Controls across Outcomes and Stratifications (Eq 1 & Eq 4).
State & Local Nonprofit Industry Sample Size
Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Primary Alternate Primary Alternate Primary Alternate
Full Sample 0.217*** 0.226*** 0.411*** 0.471*** 0.468*** 0.461*** 13,840
(0.077) (0.074) (0.073) (0.069) (0.076) (0.075)
By Broad Discipline
Engineering 0.420*** 0.425*** 0.579*** 0.598*** 3,684
(0.159) (0.154) (0.153) (0.152)
Environmental Sciences 0.511** 0.476** 1,376
(0.213) (0.210)
Life Sciences 0.646*** 0.684*** 0.537*** 0.534*** 2,480
(0.164) (0.150) (0.158) (0.153)
Math & Computer Science 0.476*** 0.869*** 0.945*** 1,536
(0.184) (0.227) (0.217)
Physical Sciences 0.373** 0.445** 0.416** 2,068
(0.168) (0.205) (0.201)
Psychology & Social Sciences 0.285** 0.294** 0.627*** 0.629*** 2,696
(0.127) (0.125) (0.121) (0.121)
By Broad Discipline & Funding Capacity
Full Sample, High Capacity 0.516*** 0.525*** 0.662*** 0.631*** 4,264
(0.174) (0.167) (0.209) (0.209)
Full Sample, Low Capacity 0.369*** 0.413*** 0.351*** 0.349*** 9,576
(0.083) (0.080) (0.085) (0.084)
Engineering, High Capacity 0.757** 1,188
(0.338)
Engineering, Low Capacity 0.622*** 0.644*** 2,496
(0.183) (0.183)
Life Sciences, High Capacity 0.621** 0.613** 688
(0.317) (0.309)
Life Sciences, Low Capacity 0.615*** 0.658*** 0.394** 0.411** 1,792
(0.183) (0.175) (0.174) (0.172)
Math & Computer Science, High Capacity 1.060** 0.962** 1.212*** 1.138*** 476
(0.537) (0.481) (0.450) (0.425)
Math & Computer Science, Low Capacity 0.666** 0.687** 1,060
(0.271) (0.268)
Physical Sciences, High Capacity -0.898** 600
(0.442)
Psychology & Social Sciences, High Capacity 0.460** 0.446** 884
(0.202) (0.198)
Psychology & Social Sciences, Low Capacity 0.600*** 0.592*** 1,812
(0.152) (0.151)
By Broad Discipline & University Type
Full Sample, Public 0.305*** 0.306*** 0.451*** 0.501*** 0.463*** 0.458*** 10,068
(0.088) (0.084) (0.080) (0.076) (0.087) (0.084)
Engineering, Public 0.512*** 0.481*** 0.494*** 0.638*** 0.668*** 2,684
(0.190) (0.177) (0.165) (0.178) (0.175)
Life Sciences, Public 0.533*** 0.585*** 0.517*** 0.515*** 1,836
(0.169) (0.157) (0.186) (0.182)
Physical Sciences, Public 0.427** 0.633*** 0.592*** 1,452
(Continued)
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illustrate the sensitivity of the results for this empirical approach, Table 9 presents the statisti-
cally significant federal elasticities both from the primary model (Eq 1) and the alternate
dynamic panel model (Eq 4). The latter relaxes the assumption for the instrument specification
on the vector of additional non-federal variables from endogenous to predetermined. As in
Table 8, each elasticity presented is the response to the federal funding and comes from a
unique regression by outcome and stratification. Elasticities presented in Columns 1, 3, and 5
are from the primary model (Eq 1) and specify the non-federal funding controls as endoge-
nous, while the elasticities presented in Columns 2, 4, and 6, are from the alternate model (Eq
4) and define the non-federal controls as predetermined. The results across the two models are
very similar, though the range of significant results is greater for the alternate dynamic panel
model (Eq 4) with the relaxed assumption (as we would expect). This illustrates the sensitivity
of the results due to the instrument specification.
Policy Significance
The statistically significant findings from this analysis are of policy significance. In this section
we provide interpretations of the robust elasticities based on the mean calculations for the vari-
ous academic fields–which again is interpreted as analogous to academic departments. To cal-
culate these examples, the average funding levels were pulled from the various stratifications by
federal, nonprofit, state and local, and industry sources. The descriptive statistics on the mean
Table 9. (Continued)
State & Local Nonprofit Industry Sample Size
Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Primary Alternate Primary Alternate Primary Alternate
(0.213) (0.228) (0.215)
Psychology & Social Sciences, Public 0.379*** 0.390*** 0.547*** 0.542*** 1,948
(0.140) (0.140) (0.139) (0.140)
Environmental Sciences, Public 0.561** 0.614*** 1,072
(0.229) (0.234)
Math & Computer Sciences, Public 0.465** 0.845*** 0.913*** 1,076
(0.216) (0.242) (0.233)
Full Sample, Private 0.344** 0.527*** 0.515*** 3,772
(0.140) (0.151) (0.149)
Math & Computer Sciences, Private 0.810*** 0.827*** 460
(0.245) (0.246)
Life Sciences, Private 0.700*** 0.734*** 0.635*** 0.683*** 644
(0.261) (0.230) (0.237) (0.229)
Psychology & Social Sciences, Private 0.454** 0.467** 748
(0.193) (0.196)
Notes: Coefficients and standard errors are reported; coefficients represent elasticities; clustered standard errors (clustered by institution-field);
*** p<0.01,
** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Each elasticity is the federal funding coefficient by outcome across stratifications. Each elasticity is from a different regression run on the sub-
sample of the specified stratification and outcome. Elasticities from the primary model, columns 1, 3, and 5, specify the controls of non-federal funding as
endogenous (Eq 1) and uses time t–k, where k  2, to instrument for t. Elasticities from the alternate model, columns 2, 4, and 6, specify the controls of
non-federal funding as predetermined (Eq 4) and uses time t – ‘, where ‘  1, to instrument for t.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157325.t009
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distributions, by source and stratification, are provided in S1 Table. Again, the elasticity is
interpreted as a 1% change in federal funding being associated with a Beta% change in the
funding level of nonprofit, state and local, or industry.
Consider the case of the division of life sciences. Academic fields in the life sciences at public
universities have an average federal investment of approximately $22 million. A 1% increase in
federal funding of approximately $224,000, is associated with a 0.517% increase in industry
funding and a 0.533% increase in nonprofit funding. Given the average industry funding level
of $1.7 million and $2.4 million nonprofit funding, this marginal increase in federal funding
would be associated with a crowding in of an additional $8,900 from industry and $12,800
from nonprofits. Meanwhile, the life sciences at private universities are operating with much
larger budgets, on average, with average federal funding of $43 million and $5 million in non-
profit funding. A 1% increase in federal funding of approximately $433,000 is associated with a
0.7% increase in nonprofit funding of approximately $35,000, on average.
To contrast, engineering fields operate with significantly smaller budgets than life sciences.
Even high capacity engineering fields have an average federal funding level of approximately
$15 million. A 1% increase in their federal funding of $150,000 is associated with a 0.757%
increase in state and local funding. With an average state and local budget of $1.3 million, the
federal increase would crowd in an additional $9,500 from state and local sources. However, a
low capacity engineering field has an average federal funding level of just $1.8 million; so a 1%
increase in federal funding would be an additional $18,000. Based on our findings, this would
crowd in industry funding. Given the average industry funding level of $222,000, this would
lead to an additional $1,400 in industry funding.
Similarly, the social sciences and psychology fields have smaller budgets on average, ranging
from an average of $609,000 for low capacity fields to $5.4 million for high capacity. Each
exhibits a positive crowd in from nonprofit funding with elasticities of 0.460% and 0.6% from a
1% increase in federal funding. This would provide an additional $4,000 to high capacity fields
and $600 to low capacity fields given the average nonprofit funding levels of $875,000 and
$100,000 respectively.
As seen from these illustrations, the results from this analysis find consistent crowding in
from federal funding but the impact varies across field characteristics. While the robust elastici-
ties are positive, the majority of the coefficients are less than one. However, industry and non-
profit funding from high research capacity math and computer science fields report robust
elasticities greater than one, pointing to a higher level of responsiveness to changes in federal
R&D funding.
Conclusion
Investments in science provide knowledge and discoveries that advance national priorities and
drive economic growth. Our analysis demonstrates a complementary relationship between fed-
eral science funding and non-federal funders. Each funder of academic science has unique
objectives, which include commercial success for private industry, societal benefit for nonprofit
organizations, and local economic development for state and local governments. The results
suggest that the organizations that fund science are all part of a system that is positively influ-
enced by federal research investment activity. Rather than crowd out additional investment, we
find evidence that federal science funding crowds in additional funding from industry, non-
profits, and state and local governments, thereby furthering their objectives.
In this analysis, we focus at the level of academic science fields–analogous to academic
departments–within the university context. Rather than estimate the relationships at the aggre-
gate institution level, we focus more closely on the unit of research production and draw upon
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the population of research-active scientific fields at U.S. doctoral granting research universities.
Using instrumental variables, we include both the lagged logged dependent variable to account
for prior levels of the non-federal funding source and a set of first differences R&D funding
regressors to control for time-invariant factors that may account for the institution-field’s abil-
ity to secure funding. Using the NSF HERD Survey, we draw upon a broader portfolio of fund-
ing sources than previously available. We examine nonprofit organizations using new data that
have not previously been available. The analysis is limited to consider the five years for which
data are currently available; however the analysis should be expanded in the future as more
years become available.
While other countries are increasing their commitment to funding science, U.S. science suf-
fers under Congressional control of discretionary funding [29]. Current funding levels from
non-federal sources are not able to compensate for decreases in federal research funding.
Moreover–as the results from this analysis suggest–decreases in federal research funding would
likely be associated with a decrease in research investment from other sources. From a more
positive perspective, federal research funding is not only a large source of investment for aca-
demic science; it also induces investment from myriad other sources.
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